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Abstract
I commemorate David Lewis by describing some of the modal involvements
of analytical mechanics. I rst review the elementary aspects of the Lagrangian,
Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi approaches. I then discuss two modal involve-
ments; both are related to Lewis’ work on modality, especially on counterfactuals.
The rst is the way Hamilton-Jacobi theory uses ensembles, i.e. sets of pos-
sible initial conditions. The structure of this set of ensembles remains to be
explored by philosophers.
The second is the way the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches’ varia-
tional principles state the law of motion by mentioning contralegal dynamical
evolutions. This threatens to contravene the principle that an actual truth, in
particular an actual law, is made true by actual states of aairs. Though this
threat can be avoided, at least for simple systems, it repays scrutiny; not least
because it leads to some open questions.
1email: jb56@cus.cam.ac.uk; jeremy.buttereld@all-souls.oxford.ac.uk
1 Introduction
It is an honour to take part in commemorating David Lewis. He was a great philoso-
pher, whose genius graced our lives in many ways: how much we miss his transcendent
creativity and craftsmanship, his enormous intellectual generosity|and his sense of
fun.
I propose to commemorate Lewis by discussing modality in analytical mechanics.
Though this topic is not close to his interests, it will illustrate a view central to his
metaphysical system, and to his influence on analytical philosophy: that science, indeed
all our knowledge and belief, is steeped in modality. There will also be some more
specic connections with Lewis’ views, especially his theory of counterfactuals (1973).
Although philosophers seem not to have explored the modal involvements of an-
alytical mechanics, they are both rich and subtle. There is much to explore here:
as so often in the philosophy of physics, one can mine from a little physics, a lot of
philosophy|at least, a lot more than one paper! To be brief enough, I shall have to
be selective in various ways. The three main ones are:{
1) I shall consider only a limited class of classical mechanical systems, and give a
technically elementary presentation of how the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian and Hamilton-
Jacobi approaches treat them (Section 2). To be a bit more specic: I shall consider
only systems with nitely many degrees of freedom, for which any constraints can be
solved; and my presentation will eschew modern geometry. This limitation is largely a
matter of brevity and expository convenience: much of the philosophical discussion in
Sections 3 et seq. applies more widely.
2) I discuss just two ways in which elementary analytical mechanics is modally in-
volved. They are probably the two most obvious modal involvements: the rst relates
to Hamilton-Jacobi theory, the second to the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches.
3) These modal involvements are entangled, technically and philosophically, with
the fact that these three approaches provide general schemes for solving problems,
or for representing their solutions. These general schemes have various features and
merits; which I believe hold philosophical morals. But here I will set them aside.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I review elements of analyti-
cal mechanics. Since philosophers are often familiar with elementary Lagrangian and
Hamiltonian mechanics, but rarely with Hamilton-Jacobi theory, I will give more detail
about the latter. In Section 3, I begin my discussion of modality. I distinguish three
grades of modal involvement, according to which kind of actual matters of fact they
allow to vary counterfactually. Thus the rst grade considers counterfactual initial
and/or nal conditions, but keeps xed the forces on the system and the laws of mo-
tion. It is most strikingly illustrated by Hamilton-Jacobi theory’s S-function, which
represents a structured ensemble of such conditions. The theory involves many dif-
ferent S-functions, and so ensembles: so I discuss the structure of this set in Section
4. In particular, there is an analogy with Lewis’ spheres of worlds. The third grade
of modal involvement, which considers counterfactual laws of motion, is illustrated by
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the way variational principles, such as Hamilton’s Principle, invoke evolutions that
violate the actual law. This prompts a discussion (Section 5) whether variational prin-
ciples violate the philosophical principle that any actual truth is made true by an
actual \truthmaker". I argue that they do not, at least for simple systems. But the
topic brings out various points, including an analogy with Lewis; and also some open
questions.
2 Technical preliminaries
I will rst review the mathematics and physics I need; (without proofs, but with a
few references). Much of what follows is pure mathematics, though I will use a nota-
tion and jargon suggestive of mechanics. Each of the three approaches|Lagrangian,
Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi|has a Subsection.
2.1 The calculus of variations and Lagrangian mechanics
I begin with the simplest problem of the calculus of variations. This is the variational
problem (in a notation suggestive of mechanics)
δI := δI[qi] = δ
∫ t1
t0
L(q1, . . . , qn, _q1, . . . , _qn, t)dt = 0 , (2.1)
where [ ] indicates that I is a functional, the dot denotes dierentiation with respect to
t, and L is to be a C2 (twice continuously dierentiable) function in all 2n+1 arguments.
L is the Lagrangian or fundamental function; and
∫
L dt is the fundamental integral. I
will discuss this only locally; i.e. I will consider a xed simply connected region G of
(n + 1)-dimensional real space IRn+1, on which there are coordinates (q1, . . . , qn, t) =:
(qi, t). I will often suppress the subscripts i, j etc. running from 1 to n, and write (q, t)
etc.
The singling out of a coordinate t (called the parameter of the problem), to give
a parametric representation of curves q(t) := qi(t), is partly a matter of notational
clarity. But it is of course suggestive of the application to mechanics, where t is
time, q represents the system’s conguration and (qi, t)-space is often called ‘extended
conguration space’ or ‘event space’. Besides, the singling out of t reflects the fact
that we do not require the fundamental integral to be independent of the choice of
t; indeed we shall note in Section 2.2 that allowing this dependence is necessary for
making Legendre transformations.2
2Of course, the calculus of variations can be developed on the assumption that the fundamental
integral is to be parameter-independent|if it could not be, so much the worse for relativistic theories!
But the details, in particular of how to set up a canonical formalism, are dierent from what follows
in this Section, and I set them aside; (cf. e.g. Rund (1966, Chapter 3)). Suce it to say that the
philosophical morals of Sections 3 et seq. hold good for parameter-independent problems.
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A necessary condition for I to be stationary at the C2 curve q(t) := qi(t)|i.e.
for δI = 0 in comparison with other C2 curves that (i) share with q(t) the end-
points q(t0), q(t1) and (ii) are close to q(t) in both value and derivative throughout
t0 < t < t1|is that: q(t) satises for t0 < t < t1 the n second-order Euler-Lagrange
(also known as: Lagrange) equations
d
dt
L _qi − Lqi = 0 i = 1, . . . , n, (2.2)




is elementary. Under certain conditions, the converse also holds: that is, eq. 2.2 is
sucient for eq. 2.1, i.e. for I to be stationary . A curve satisfying eq. 2.2 is called an
extremal.
We apply these ideas to mechanics, getting Lagrangian mechanics. One considers a
mechanical system with n congurational degrees of freedom. Note that if the system
consists of N point-particles (or bodies small enough to be treated as point-particles),
so that a conguration is xed by 3N cartesian coordinates, we may yet have n < 3N ;
for the system may be subject to constraints and the qi are to be independently variable
in the region G.
I shall assume that the system is simple, in the sense that it has the following ve
features. Note: (1): My discussion of the Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi approaches
will retain this restriction; and add some other ones. (2): Some of these features, e.g.
(iii), evidently involve modal notions; but I will postpone discussion of these aspects
till Section 3 et seq..
(i): Any constraints on the system are holonomic; i.e. each is expressible as an equa-
tion f(r1, . . . , rm) = 0 among the coordinates rk of the system’s component parts; (here
the rk could be the 3N cartesian coordinates of N point-particles, so that m := 3N).
A set of c such constraints can in principle be solved, dening a (m − c)-dimensional
hypersurface Q in the m-dimensional space of the rs; so that on the configuration space
Q we can dene n := m− c independent coordinates qi, i = 1, . . . , n.
(ii): Any constraints on the system are scleronomic, i.e. independent of time. So
the conguration space Q is identied once and for all; and we can take the region
G  IRn+1 as a cartesian product of Q with a time-interval [t−, t+]  IR (where we
allow t− = −1, t+ = +1).
(iii): Any constraints on the system are ideal; i.e. the forces that maintain the
constraints would do no work in any possible displacement consistent with the con-
straints and applied forces (called a virtual displacement). This allows us to deduce
the principle of virtual work, and thereby d’Alembert’s principle.
D’Alembert’s principle implies that for a holonomic system (i.e. obeying (i)), the






k) and generalized forces Qi (which are dened for i = 1, . . . , n, in terms
of the vector applied force Fk on particle k, and position vector rk of particle k, by:
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(T _qi)− Tqi = Qi ; (2.3)
which are also sometimes called Lagrange’s equations.
(iv): The applied forces are monogenic; i.e. the total work δw done in an innites-
imal virtual displacement is integrable; its integral is the work function U . (The term
‘monogenic’ is due to Lanczos (1986, p.30), but followed by others e.g. Goldstein et al.
(2002, p. 34).)
(v): Furthermore, the system is conservative; i.e. the work function U is inde-
pendent of both the time and the generalized velocities _qi, and depends only on the
qi: U = U(q1, . . . , qn). We interpret V := −U as potential energy. Then (ii) and (v)
together imply the conservation of energy, i.e. the constancy in time of T + V .
Besides, (v) and the denition of Qi in (iii) implies that Qi = −Vqi; so that, dening
the Lagrangian L := T − V , eq. 2.3 take on the form of the Euler-Lagrange equations,
i.e. eq. 2.2. With this L  T − V , eq. 2.2 are called Lagrange’s equations.
For a simple system, Lagrange’s equations are sufficient (Whittaker (1959, Section
99)) for the fundamental integral I =
∫
L dt to be stationary. So we infer Hamilton’s
Principle: that the motion in conguration space of a simple system, between pre-
scribed congurations at times t0 and t1, makes stationary
∫
L dt (which is now called





L(qi, _qi)dt = 0 . (2.4)
As I mentioned in Section 1, my restriction to simple systems is largely a matter
of brevity and expository convenience, not of substance. Much of both the formalism
below, and the philosophical morals of later Sections, apply more widely. For example,
in the last paragraph’s deduction of eq. 2.2, the assumption of conservativity, (v),
could be weakened so as to allow V to have explicit time-dependence and even some
forms of velocity-dependence; (cf. e.g. Goldstein et al. (2002, p. 22); hence eq. 2.1’s
allowance of t as an argument of L.).
But beware: some signicant points in what follows are restricted. The most im-
portant example concerns the deduction of Hamilton’s Principle from the equations
of motion eq. 2.2; (cf. the last paragraph but one and Whittaker (ibid.)). This de-
duction depends in a subtle way on the system being simple (more specically, on
the constraints being holonomic); cf. Papastavridis (2002, pp. 960-973). We shall
see in Section 5 that this leaves us open questions about the modal involvements of
Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics for non-simple systems.
Finally, I note that the power of Lagrangian mechanics as a scheme for solving
problems arises in large part from its equations being invariant under arbitrary trans-
formations, with non-vanishing Jacobian, of the qi (called point transformations). Thus
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we are free to use coordinates qi to suit the problem at hand: the equations of motion
will retain the form eq. 2.2.
2.2 Canonical equations and Hamiltonian mechanics
Under certain conditions, the variational problem eq. 2.1 has an equivalent form, the
canonical form, for which the Euler-Lagrange equations are 2n rst order equations,
rather than n second order equations. Starting from eq. 2.1, we dene new variables
pi := L _qi , (2.5)
called (canonical) momenta, since in mechanics examples they often coincide with
momenta. Recalling that L is C2 we now assume that the Hessian with respect to the
_qs does not vanish in the domain G considered, i.e. the determinant
j L _qi _qj j 6= 0 ; (2.6)
so that eq. 2.5 can be solved for the _qi as functions of qi, pi, t : _qi = _qi(qj , pj, t). Then
the equations
pi = L _qi _qi = Hpi L(qi, _qi, t) + H(qi, pi, t) = i _qipi (2.7)
represent a Legendre transformation and its inverse; where in the third equation _qi are
understood as functions of (qj, pj, t) according to the inversion of eq. 2.5. The function
H(qi, pi, t) is called the Legendre (or: Hamiltonian) function of the variational problem,
and the qs and ps are called canonically conjugate. It follows that H is C2 in all its
arguments, Ht = −Lt, and j L _qi _qj j = j Hpipj j−1. Besides, any function H(qi, pi, t)
that is C2 in all its arguments, and has a non-vanishing Hessian with respect to the
ps, j Hpipj j6= 0, is the Legendre function of a C2 Lagrangian L that is given in terms
of H by eq. 2.7.
Applying this Legendre transformation, the Euler-Lagrange equations eq. 2.2 go
over to the canonical system of equations (also known as: Hamilton’s equations)
_qi = Hpi _pi = −Hqi (= Lqi) . (2.8)
(A curve satisfying these equations is also called an extremal.)
Furthermore, these are the Euler-Lagrange equations of a variational problem equiv-




(i _qipi −H(qi, pi, t)) dt = 0 . (2.9)
The reason for the equivalence, in brief, is:{ The variation of L = i _qipi−H with respect
to pi gives δL = i( _qi − ∂H∂pi )δpi. Since the term in brackets vanishes by Hamilton’s
equations, an arbitrary variation of the pi has no influence on the variation of L; so
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the Euler-Lagrange equations got by varying the qs and ps independently are eq. 2.8,
i.e. the Legendre transform of the originals, eq. 2.2.3
Applying these ideas to the Lagrangian mechanics of a simple system, understood
as in Section 2.1, we get Hamiltonian mechanics. Thus we now assume not only that
the mechanical system is simple, but also that eq. 2.6 holds. And we think of the
system’s state-space as, not Q, but the 2n-dimensional phase space Γ coordinatized
by the ps and qs; (technically it is the cotangent bundle of Q|but as announced in
Section 1, I eschew modern geometry!). The system’s motion is given by the new
variational principle, sometimes called the modified Hamilton’s Principle, eq. 2.9; or
more explicitly, by Hamilton’s equations, eq. 2.8.
The Hamiltonian mechanics of a simple system is equivalent to Section 2.1’s La-
grangian mechanics, together with eq. 2.6. But it has several advantages over La-
grangian mechanics, as regards both problem-solving and general theory; though I
need only mention two.4
(i): Its replacement of partial dierential equations by ordinary ones, which are
typically easier to deal with. In particular, the theory of ordinary dierential equa-
tions makes the initial value problem straightfoward, in that through a given point
(q0, p0) := (q01 , . . . , q0n ; p01, . . . , p0n) 2 Γ, there passes a unique solution of eq. 2.8, i.e.
a unique extremal with qi(0) = q0i , pi(0) = p0i .
(ii): Its replacement of the group of point transformations on Q by what is in ef-
fect a larger group of transformations on Γ, the canonical transformations. There is
a rich and multi-faceted theory of canonical transformations. But I will not need any
details about this, except to remark that generating functions, which represent one of
the three main approaches to the theory5, provide one important way to analyse the
modal involvements of Hamiltonian mechanics and Hamilton-Jacobi theory. I take up
this topic in Buttereld (2003).
2.3 Hamilton-Jacobi theory
I shall discuss Hamilton-Jacobi theory in more detail than Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
mechanics; both because it is less familiar to philosophers and because we need the de-
tail in order to explore its modal involvements. In Section 2.3.1, I follow in Hamilton’s
(1833, 1834) footsteps, introducing the Hamilton-Jacobi equation via Hamilton’s char-
3For more discussion of the Legendre transformation, cf. e.g.: Arnold (1989, Chap.s 3.14, 9.45.C),
Courant and Hilbert (1953, Chap. IV.9.3; 1962, Chap. I.6), Lanczos (1986, Chap VI.1-4).) I stress
that in the theory of the Legendre transformation, the assumption of a non-vanishing Hessian, eq. 2.6
(equivalently: j Hpipj j6= 0), is crucial; if it fails, we need a dierent theory (called constrained dynam-
ics). Incidentally, it also implies that the fundamental integral cannot be parameter-independent; cf.
e.g. Rund (1966, pp. 16, 141-144).
4Other advantages of the Hamiltonian approach, from a physical perspective, include: (a) it can
be applied to systems to which the Lagrangian approach does not apply, i.e. in modern terms, whose
phase space is not a cotangent bundle; (b) it connects analytical mechanics with other elds of physics,
especially statistical mechanics and optics.
5The other two approaches are symplectic geometry and integral invariants.
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acteristic function (as do many mechanics textbooks); and then I discuss the calculus
of variations (Section 2.3.2). Even so, these details will give only a limited view of a
rich and many-faceted theory. In particular:
(1) I will ignore aspects to do with problem-solving (especially the use of separation
of variables, leading on to action-angle variables and Liouville’s theorem) since|though
obviously crucial for physics, and so rightly emphasised in textbooks|they are not il-
luminating about modality.
(2) I will ignore the integration theory of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, which
involves the theory of generating functions and complete integrals. This deep (and
beautifully geometric) theory does illuminate Hamilton-Jacobi theory’s modal involve-
ments; but space prevents me addressing it here (cf. Buttereld 2003).
(3) Both Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 will emphasise the description of motion in the ex-
tended conguration space of Section 2.1, i.e. the region G  IRn+1; while it is equally
illuminating to consider Hamilton-Jacobi theory in phase space. But this emphasis on
G  IRn+1 will suce for our purposes|to reveal some distinctive modal involvements.
2.3.1 The characteristic function and the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
We assume that our region G  IRn+1 is suciently small that between any two
\event" points E1 = (q1i, t1), E2 = (q2i, t2) there is a unique extremal curve C. To
avoid double subscripts, we will in this Section sometimes suppress the i, writing
E1 = (q1, t1), E2 = (q2, t2) etc. Then the value of the fundamental integral along
C is a well-dened function of the coordinates of the end-points; which we call the
characteristic function and write as






(ipi _qi −H) dt =
∫
ipidqi −Hdt (2.10)
where the integral is understood as taken along the unique extremal C between the
end-points, and we have used the Legendre transformation eq. 2.7.
Making arbitrary small displacements (δq1, δt1), (δq2, δt2) at E1, E2 respectively, and
using the fact that the integral is taken along an extremal, we get for the variation δS
of S












δq2i = [i piδqi −H(qj , pj, t)δt]t2t1 . (2.11)
Since the displacements are independent, we can identify each of the coecients on the
two sides of the last equation in eq. 2.11, getting
∂S
∂t2











in which the pi refer to the extremal C at E1 and E2.
These equations are remarkable, since they enable us, if we know the function
S(q1, t1, q2, t2) to determine all the possible motions of the system|without solving
any dierential equations! For suppose we are given the initial conditions (q1, p1, t1),
i.e. the conguration and canonical momenta at time t1, and also the function S. The
n equations ∂S
∂q1
= −p1 in eq. 2.13 relate the n + 1 quantities (q2, t2) to the given
constants q1, p1, t1. So in principle, we can solve these equations by a purely algebaric
process, to get q2 as a function of t2 and the constants q1, p1, t1; i.e. to get the system’s




2.12. So indeed the problem is solved without performing integrations, i.e. just by
dierentiation and elimination: a very remarkable technique.6
In fact we can from now on ignore the initial time equations eq. 2.13 and study
only the n + 1 nal time equations eq. 2.12. Roughly speaking, the reason is that eq.
2.12 contains enough information for us to analyse fully the system’s motion.7 So we
will often write t rather than t2 and q rather than q2.
Substituting the second set of equations of eq. 2.12 in the rst, and rewriting t2, q2






, t) = 0 . (2.14)
This rst order partial dierential equation is the Hamilton-Jacobi equation; it is non-
linear since the contribution of the kinetic energy T to the Hamiltonian will contain p2
terms. Throughout this Subsection and the next, we will focus on this equation.
So our rst result is that the characteristic function S(q1, t1; q2, t2) considered as a
function of the n + 1 arguments (q2, t2) = (q2i, t2) (i.e. with (q1, t1) xed) satises the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Besides, by xing E1 = (q1, t1) and considering dierent
values for S, we see that S denes a family of hypersurfaces, which we can call ‘spheres’
with centre E1 = (q1, t1). Thus the sphere with radius R is given by the equation
S(q1, t1; q2, t2) = R (2.15)
with (q1, t1) considered xed. Every point E2 = (q2, t2) on this sphere is connected to
the centre E1 = (q1, t1) by a unique extremal along which the fundamental integral
has value R. This is amusingly reminiscent of Lewis’ spheres of worlds (1973, Chapter
1.3; 1986, Chapter 1.3): and more than amusingly|we will see in Section 4 that the
analogy is deeper.
6As Hamilton realized. He writes, in the impersonal style of the day, that ‘Mr Hamilton’s function
S ... must not be confounded with that so beautifully conceived by Lagrange for the more simple
and elegant expression of the known dierential equations [i.e. L]. Lagrange’s function states, Mr
Hamilton’s function would solve the problem. The one serves to form the dierential equations of
motion, the other would give their integrals’ (1834, p. 514).
7This insight is essentially due to Jacobi. For discussion, cf. Dugas (1988, p. 401), Lanczos (1986,
pp. 225, 231-34, 254-57).
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Of course, partial dierential equations have many solutions: (the main contrast
with ordinary dierential equations being that typically, the solution of a partial dier-
ential equation contains an arbitrary function (or functions) rather than an arbitrary
constant (or constants)). So Hamilton-Jacobi theory studies the whole space of solu-
tions of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. In Section 2.3.1.B, I will describe the rst steps
of this study, by considering families of hypersurfaces that foliate G, congruences of
curves that cross the hypersurfaces and ll G, and a notion of field associated (by a
Legendre transformation) with congruences. After introducing these notions, I state
(without proof) the equivalence of three dierent propositions: an equivalence which
we will later see to reveal the structure of the modal involvements of Hamilton-Jacobi
theory. (A good reference is Rund (1966, Chap. 2), who cites various masters of the
last two centuries, especially Caratheodory.)
2.3.2 Hypersurfaces and fields
We consider families of hypersurfaces in our region G of IRn+1
S(qi, t) = σ (2.16)
with σ 2 IR the parameter labelling the family, and S a C2 function (in all n + 1
arguments). We assume this family covers the region G simply, in the sense that
through each point of G there passes a unique hypersurface in the family.
We also need to consider congruences of curves which ll G simply, in the cor-
responding sense that through each point of G there passes a unique curve in the
congruence; and parametric representations of such a congruence. This means the con-
gruence is represented by n equations giving qi as C
2 functions of n parameters uα and
t
qi = qi(uα, t) , i = 1, . . . , n ; (2.17)
where each set of n uα = (u1, . . . , un) labels a unique curve in the congruence. Thus
there is a one-to-one correspondence (qi, t) $ (uα, t) in appropriate domains of the
variables, with non-vanishing Jacobian
j ∂qi
∂uα
j 6= 0 . (2.18)
Such a congruence determines tangent vectors ( _qi, 1) at each (qi, t); and thereby
also values of the Lagrangian L(qi(uα, t), _qi(uα, t), t) and of the momentum




Conversely, a set of 2n C2 functions qi, pi of (uα, t) as in eqs 2.17 and 2.19, with the qs
and ps related by pi =
∂L
∂ _qi
, determines (by a Legendre transformation, using eq. 2.6) a
set of tangent vectors, and so a congruence. Such a set of 2n functions is called a field;
and if all the curves of the congruence are extremals, it is called a field of extremals.
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We say a eld belongs to a family of hypersurfaces given by eq. 2.16 i throughout
the region G the pi =
∂L
∂ _qi








S(qi(uα, t), t) .
8 (2.21)
We similarly say that the congruence of curves (dened from the eld by the Legendre
transformation) belongs to the family of hypersurfaces.
Finally, we say that a eld qi = qi(uα, t), pi = pi(uα, t) is canonical if the qi, pi
satisfy Hamilton’s equations eq. 2.8: equivalently, if the curves of the congruence
(dened from the eld by the Legendre transformation) are extremals.
So much for denitions; now the result. The following three conditions on a C2
function S : G ! IR are equivalent:






, t) = 0 . (2.22)
(2): The eld belonging to the C2 function S : G ! IR, i.e. the eld dened at
each point in G by pi =
∂S
∂qi
, is canonical. Equivalently: the curves of the congruence
belonging to S (the congruence dened from the eld by the Legendre transformation)
are extremals.
(3): The value of the fundamental integral
∫
L dt along the curve C of the congru-
ence belonging to S, from any point P1 on the surface S(qi, t) = σ1 to that point P2 on
the surface S(qi, t) = σ2 that lies on C, is the same for whatever point P1 we choose;
and the value is just σ2 − σ1. That is:
∫ P2
P1
L dt = σ2 − σ1 .9 (2.23)
Condition (3) suggests another piece of jargon: a family of hypersurfaces S = σ sat-
isfying any, and so all, of these three conditions is called geodesically (or: geodetically)
equidistant with respect to the Lagrangian L. Finally we remark that the concentric
spheres centred on E1 = (q1, t1) introduced above (eq. 2.15) are an example of a
geodesically equidistant family. (In fact they are a \fundamental" example, in that
8One can show that a eld belongs to a family of hypersurfaces i for all indices α, β = 1, . . . , n,
the Lagrange brackets of the parameters of the eld, i.e.












vanish identically. Warning: the role of Lagrange brackets in this theory is sometimes omitted even
in excellent accounts, e.g. Courant and Hilbert (1962, Chap. II.9.4).
9More precisely: (1) and (3) are exactly equivalent, (1) implies (2); and (2) implies that ∂S∂t +
H(q, ∂S∂q , t) is a function of t only, and this function can be absorbed into H . For proofs, cf. e.g. Rund
(1966, Chap. 2.2-3), Courant and Hilbert (1962, Chapter II.9.2-4).
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other families can be \built" from them in ways studied under the names of ‘Green’s
functions’, and ‘Huygens’ principle’.)
To sum up: this result gives us considerable information about the solutions of the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Any solution S that is smooth and local (specically: C2
and dened in a simply connected region G) has level surfaces S = constant which are
traversed by a congruence of extremals so as to make the level surfaces a geodesically
equidistant family.
But so far it is an open question which n-dimensional surfaces M in G are level
surfaces of some smooth, say C2, solution S (in G). In fact it can be shown, subject
to some mild conditions about non-vanishing determinants etc., that:
(1): any n-dimensional surface M is a level surface of a solution, and this solution
is uniquely dened throughout G by its values on M (say S = 0 on M); and
(2): for any such surface M and any suitably smooth function S : M ! IR, there
is a uniquely dened solution on all of G which restricts on M to the given S. (So (2)
generalizes (1) by M not having to be a level surface.)
In the jargon: the initial value problem for the Hamilton-Jacobi equation has locally
a solution, that is unique given suitably smooth prescribed values of S. But I shall not
go into details about this. It suces to state the intuitive idea for the case where M is
a level surface: the solution is \grown" from the given surface by erecting a congruence
of curves, transverse to the surface, and passing along them to mark o a given value
of the fundamental integral
∫
L dt; by varying the value, one denes a geodesically
equidistant family and so a solution S. (For details, cf. Rund (1966, Chap. 2.7-8),
Benton (1977, Chap. 1); and more heuristically, Courant and Hilbert (1962, Chap.
II.9.2-5) and Born and Wolf (1999, Appendix I.2-4).)
Returning nally to mechanics: it is clear that each solution S of the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation represents a kind of ensemble of mechanical systems; where ‘ensemble’
is physicist’s jargon for a ctitious population of systems (maybe including the actual
system). Thus each solution S represents an ensemble with the feature that at all
times t, there is a strict conguration|momentum, i.e. q− p, correlation given by the
gradient of S. That is, S prescribes for any given (q, t), a unique (p, t) := (∂S
∂q
, t).
So much by way of expounding Hamilton-Jacobi theory. We will return, after
Section 3’s introduction of modality, to discuss the structure of this set of ensembles
(set of S-functions)|and so the modal involvements of Hamilton-Jacobi theory.
3 Kinds of modal involvement
I turn to discussing the modal involvements of these three approaches to analytical
mechanics. In this Section, I begin with the obvious fact that postulating a space of
possible states (a state-space) brings in modality. This leads to a suggested distinction
between three grades of modal involvement, which are all illustrated by analytical
mechanics. In this Section, I just briefly mention some illustrations: the next two
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Sections discuss some more striking illustrations of the rst and third grades.
We have seen that the starting-point of each approach to analytical mechanics is
to postulate the set of all possible states (the ‘state-space’) of the system concerned;
(though the structure of this set varies between the approaches). At rst sight, the
philosophical import of this would seem to be at most some uncontroversial version of
the idea that laws support counterfactuals. That is: whether or not one believes in a
rm distinction between laws of nature and accidental generalizations, and whatever
one’s preferred account of counterfactuals, a theory that states ‘All As are Bs’ surely
in some sense warrants counterfactuals like ‘If any object were an A, it would be a B’.
And so when analytic mechanics postulates state-space and then species e.g. laws of
motion on it, it seems at rst that this just corresponds to the passage from ‘All actual
systems of this kind (having such-and-such initial states|usually a \small" proper
subset of state-space) evolve thus-and-so’ to ‘If any system of this kind were in any of
its possible initial states, it would evolve thus-and-so’.10
But this rst impression is deceptive. The structures with which state-space is
equipped by analytical mechanics, and the constructions in which it is involved, make
for more varied and nuanced involvements with modality than is suggested by just the
idea that laws support counterfactuals. In the light of Section 2, I think it is natural to
distinguish (in Quinean fashion!) three grades of modal involvement; so I shall write
(Modality;1st) etc. Like Quine’s three grades, the rst is intuitively the mildest grade,
and the third the strongest. But this order will not correspond to Section 2’s (and the
historical) order of the three approaches to analytical mechanics. In particular, the
rst and arguably most intuitive approach, Lagrangian mechanics, exhibits the third
grade of modal involvement.11
The grades are dened in terms of which kind of actual matters of fact they allow
to vary counterfactually. One kind is, roughly speaking, the given initial state of the
system. Another kind is the given physical problem: which we can here take as specied
by a number of degrees of freedom, and a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian which encode the
forces on the system. A third kind is the laws of motion, as specied by e.g. Hamilton’s
Principle or Lagrange’s or Hamilton’s equations. Thus we have the following grades.12
10Here, and in all that follows, I of course set aside the (apparent!) fact that the actual world is
quantum, not classical; so that I can talk about e.g. an actual system obeying Hamilton’s Principle.
Since my business throughout is the philosophy of classical mechanics, it is unnecessary to encumber
my argument, from time to time, with antecedents like ‘If the world were not quantum’: I leave you
to take them in your stride.
11Also, my three grades (like Quine’s) are often combined: for example, a mechanical theory (or
even a small part of one, such as a theorem) might involve the rst and third grades. But I will not
need to discuss such combinations.
12I don’t claim that these three grades are the best way to classify the modal involvements of an-
alytical mechanics. For example, it might be at least as fruitful to consider how the various kinds of
constraint (holonomic, scleronomic etc. and their contraries) classify the notion of virtual displace-
ment: this classication would cut right across the trichotomy that follows. But at least what follows
has the merits of being: obvious, suggested by Section 2’s review, and showing at least some of the
variety of modal involvement that occurs.
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(Modality;1st): The rst i.e. mildest grade keeps xed the actual given physical
problem and laws of motion. But it considers dierent initial conditions, and/or nal
and/or boundary conditions, than the actual given ones; roughly speaking, dierent
initial states of the system. And so it also considers counterfactual histories of the
system; (since under determinism, a dierent initial state implies a dierent history,
i.e. trajectory in state-space).
So this grade includes the familiar idea above, that laws support counterfactuals.
But analytical mechanics also provides more distinctive illustrations. Some are clear
from the very beginning of the subject. Thus recall Section 2.1’s denition of a simple
system: the conguration space Q is to have independently variable coordinates qi;
and to dene ideal constraints, one needs to dene a virtual displacement (as one that
the system could undergo compatibly with the constraints and applied forces). But
the most striking illustration of (Modality;1st) is Hamilton-Jacobi theory. As we saw
in Section 2.3.1, Hamilton-Jacobi theory enables you to solve a problem, as it might
be an actual one, by introducing an ensemble of systems; i.e. a set of possible systems,
of which the actual system is just one member. Besides, the ensemble can be chosen
in such a way that the problem is solved without performing integrations, i.e. just by
dierentiation and elimination. Cf. Section 4 for more discussion.
(Modality;2nd): The second grade keeps xed the laws of motion, but considers
dierent problems than the actual one (and thereby dierent initial states). Such cases
include considering a counterfactual number of degrees of freedom, or a counterfactual
potential function. Maybe no actual system is a simple system in Section 2.1’s sense,
with 5,217 coordinates (nor even is well modelled as one); and maybe no actual system
has a potential given (in certain units) by the polynomial 13x7 + 5x3 + 42. But as we
have seen, analytical mechanics continually considers such counterfactual cases. For in
Section 2, all three approaches generalized from the outset about the number of degrees
of freedom, and about what the Lagrangian or Hamiltonian was (subject of course to
conditions like eq. 2.6). Such generality of course pays o in general theorems. An
elementary example is the conservation of energy theorem for a simple system; but
there are countless others.
(Modality;3rd): The third grade considers dierent laws of motion, even for a given
problem. Again, this can happen even in Lagrangian mechanics; namely in its use
of Hamilton’s Principle eq. 2.1, and eq. 2.4 for simple systems. It also happens in
Hamiltonian mechanics with its modied Hamilton’s Principle, eq. 2.9. (And Section
2.3.1 showed that these variational principles are also involved in the Hamilton-Jacobi
approach.) In all three approaches, the use of variational principles means|not that
one explicitly states non-actual laws, much less calculates with them|but that one
states the actual law as a condition that compares the actual history of the system
with counterfactual histories of it that do not obey the law (in philosophers’ jargon: are
contralegal). That is, the counterfactual histories share the initial (and nal) conditions,
but do not obey the given deterministic laws of motion, with the given forces. (Nor
does one require that there could be forces which in conjunction with the actual laws
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and initial and nal conditions, would yield the counterfactual history.) This is at rst
sight surprising, even mysterious. How can it be possible to state the actual law by a
comparison of the actual history with possible histories that do not obey it? I take up
this question in Section 5.
To sum up, analytical mechanics gives many illustrations of all three grades: indeed,
the subject is upto its ears in modality. But rather than multiplying examples, the
remainder of this paper undertakes two projects suggested by my trichotomy. The rst
concerns Hamilton-Jacobi theory’s use of (Modality;1st). There is no special philo-
sophical difficulty here; rather the situation represents an invitation to philosophers to
study a new sort of modal structure. The second project concerns variational princi-
ples, especially in Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics. Here there is a philosophical
diculty: the variational principles threaten a plausible philosophical claim, and the
threat needs to be answered. It can be answered, at least for simple systems; but doing
so pays dividends.
4 On the set of ensembles
As I noted at the start of Section 2.3, Hamilton-Jacobi theory has several important
aspects|including general schemes for solving problems, a general theory of integra-
tion, a phase space formulation, and a deep connection with quantum theory|which
I have no space to discuss.13 About these aspects, it must here suce to say that
the S-function, representing an ensemble of systems whose q and p are correlated by
p = ∂S
∂q
, stands at the centre of all of them. So we can at least infer that Hamilton-
Jacobi theory provides (Modality;1st) in spades; or might we say, to be more elegant,
‘the apotheosis of (Modality;1st)’?!
I shall however raise the topic of the structure of Hamilton-Jacobi theory’s set of
ensembles (set of S-functions). As mentioned at the end of Section 2.3, the structure of
the set of ensembles is essentially given by the structure of the set of suitably smooth
(say C2) real functions on a n-dimensional manifold M ; (M needs to \lie across"
the region G so as to be transverse to a congruence of extremals). For since there is a
locally unique solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi initial value problem, each such function
determines|as well as is determined by|a solution throughout G of the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation. So one infers that the set of solutions (ensembles) is some kind of
innite-dimensional set.
This set has various kinds of structure, and a full discussion would have to take
account of the aspects listed above, that I am setting aside. In particular, Hamilton-
Jacobi integration theory (especially the notions of complete integral, and Jacobi’s
theorem) picks out subsets of the solution space which are signicant, both theoret-
ically and for problem-solving. But even with just the results of Section 2.3, we can
discern two kinds of structure|which bear on Lewis’ account of modality, especially
13Cf. Buttereld (2003, 2003a)
14
counterfactuals. These two kinds of structure arise from two dierent choices about
what to take as the analogue, in Hamilton-Jacobi theory, of a Lewisian possible world.
4.1 Configurations as worlds
Let us think of an event (i.e. instantaneous conguration) (qi, t) 2 G as like a possible
world. Then Hamilton’s characteristic function eq. 2.10, and the geodesic spheres
it denes eq. 2.15, yield a neat analogy with Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals. The
geodesic sphere of radius R centred on (q1, t1)
S(q1, t1; q, t) =
∫ q,t
q1,t1
L dt = R (4.1)
is like the surface of a Lewisian sphere of worlds centred on (q1, t1); (I say ‘surface’
since Lewis uses ‘sphere’ for the \bulk volume", not the boundary).
Now recall Lewis’ proposed truth-conditions for counterfactuals (1973, Chap. 1.3).
Roughly speaking, he proposes that a counterfactual ‘If A were the case, then C would
be the case’, which I will write as A ! C, is true at the actual world @ i: the
possible world most similar (for short: \closest") to @ that makes A true, also makes
C true. Better, to allow for worlds tied for similarity to @, i: all the A-worlds most
similar to @ are C-worlds. Better still, Lewis’ exact proposal avoids the assumption
that there is a set of A-worlds all tied for rst equal as regards similarity to @ (the
limit assumption). That is, he proposes the counterfactual is true at @ i: for any
A&:C-world, there is a A&C-world that is more similar (closer) to @.
We can easily transplant this kind of truth-condition to geodesic spheres; i.e. taking
points (qi, t) 2 G as worlds and ∫ L dt as the measure of distance (dissimilarity)
between such worlds. However, the resulting conditionals arguably do not deserve
the name ‘counterfactual’, since both the \base-world" (q1, t1) and the \closest A-
world", say (q, t), that the evaluation of the conditional carries us to, could be actual
congurations of the system.
For example, transplanting the second Lewisian condition (i.e. \all the closest A-
worlds are C-worlds"), we get the following truth-condition for A ! C, relative to a
given (\present") conguration (q1, t1):
At all possible congurations (q, t) such that:
(i) A is true at (q, t), and
(ii) the given conguration (q1, t1) could evolve (i.e. would evolve for some
p1 at t1) to (q, t) with t > t1, and




be as small as it can be, compatibly with (i) and (ii):|
C is also true at (q, t).
Similarly, transplanting Lewis’ ocial proposal for A ! C yields the following truth-
condition, relative to a given conguration (q1, t1):
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For any conguration (q, t) such that:
(i) A&:C is true at (q, t), and
(ii) the given conguration (q1, t1) could evolve (i.e. would evolve for some
p1 at t1) to (q, t) with t > t1:
the given conguration (q1, t1) could also evolve (i.e. would evolve for some
p1 at t1) to a conguration (q







L dt, and (b) A&C is true at (q, t).
In the abstract, these truth-conditions seem a mouthful. But in fact mechanics
provides countless examples of such conditional propositions, though of course in a
much less formal guise! A very simple example is given by a bead sliding on a wire
that lies in a vertical plane; (to be a simple system in Section 2’s sense, the bead must
slide frictionlessly). We can take A to say that the bead is at the lowest point of the
wire, and C to say that its potential energy is at a minumum. Then A ! C can be
expressed informally as ‘Whenever the bead is next at the lowest point of the wire, its
potential energy will then be at a minimum’. Similarly, with C saying instead that the
kinetic energy is at a maximum; and so on.
Finally, the results in Section 2.3.2 (especially condition (3)) implies that this dis-
cussion of counterfactuals can be generalized so as to dene similarity of worlds using
S-functions other than Hamilton’s characteristic function. For example, we could take
a n-dimensional surface M that is topologically a sphere surrounding some given point
(q1, t1) 2 G, dene M to be a surface of constant S, say S = 0, and consider the (locally
unique) solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation thereby dened outside M . That is,
we could dene the dissimilarity of our worlds (q, t) from the base-world (q1, t1), and
so the truth-conditions of counterfactuals, in terms of the value of S(q, t).
4.2 States as worlds
On the other hand, let us take as the analogue of a Lewisian world an instantaneous
state in the sense of a 2n + 1-tuple (qi, pi, t). This is perhaps a more natural choice
than Section 4.1’s instantaneous congurations (events), since it determines a history,
i.e. a phase space trajectory, of the system, our \toy-universe". (Indeed, an even closer
analogue to a Lewisian world would be such a trajectory, which is equivalent to a one-
parameter family of tuples (qi, pi, t) parameterized by time; but I will not separately
discuss this.) In any case, we retain the assumption made at the start of Section 2.3.1
that any pair of events (q1, t1), (q2, t2) 2 G are connected by a unique extremal; and so
determine a one-parameter family of \worlds" (qi, pi, t) in our sense (parameterized by
time).
As in Section 4.1, there are various constructions one could make with this concept
of world. In particular, one could dene conditionals A ! C by using an S-function|
say any solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation|to dene dissimilarity. These condi-
tionals would in general be counterfactual, since in general the \base-world" (q1, p1, t1)
will be on a dierent phase space trajectory than the (q2, p2, t2) that evaluation of the
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conditional carries us to. But I shall not pursue this; (partly for the sake of variety|for
I will anyway return to counterfactuals in Section 5.1). I shall instead describe how an
S-function enables us to dene various sets of possible worlds which are \preferred"
relative to our choice of S; in fact, the last of these denitions is important for physics.
Here again, the S-function need not be Hamilton’s characteristic function; any
solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation will do. Given such an S, every point (q, t) 2
G has an associated canonical momentum, viz. p := ∂
∂q
S(q, t), and so an associated
world in our sense, viz. (q, p  ∂S
∂q
, t). If we wish, we can also pick out subsets so
that not every event (q, t) is included in a world \preferred" by our S. For example,
we could do this by picking out a sub-manifold M of G, and dening the associated
worlds (q, p  ∂S
∂q
, t) only for (q, t) 2 M .
There are two obvious ways to specify such an M ; both make M n-dimensional.
First, we can dene M as the level surface of S that passes through some given
(q, t) 2 G. This denition will connect M with Section 2.3.2’s discussion of geodesi-
cally equidistant hypersurfaces. And thinking of (q, t) as the system’s actual present
conguration, M denes a preferred set of counterfactual events, i.e. instantaneous
congurations (which are in general not simultaneous with (q, t)).
Secondly, we can x t. (As we will see, this will mean that our worlds are given
in eect by just (q, p) not (q, p, t).) Each value of t denes M as Q  ftg, i.e. the
copy of the conguration space Q at time t; (cf. Section 2.1’s assumption (ii), of
scleronomic constraints). Now writing this copy simply as Q, S denes a function St
on Q that assigns to each q 2 Q the associated canonical momentum St(q) := ∂S(,t)∂q .
The associated preferred worlds are then given by (q, p(q)  St(q)); i.e. the worlds are
given as before, except that the xed value of t is now just implicit in the denition of
p.
Here I should mention that this second denition is important for the mathematics
and physics of Hamilton-Jacobi theory; more precisely, for Hamilton-Jacobi theory in
phase space. For consider the graph of the function St in the usual logician’s sense
of the set of ordered pairs of arguments and values; that is, consider the set of pairs
(q, p(q)  St(q)). It is a n-dimensional surface in the 2n-dimensional phase space Γ.
It turns out that it is an example of a special kind of surface, called Lagrangian sub-
manifolds. I shall not dene this notion: here it suces to remark that it is crucial for
understanding:
(i) the general (symplectic) structure of Hamiltonian mechanics and Hamilton-
Jacobi theory;
(ii) physical phenomena like focussing and caustics; these arise when the assump-
tion we made at the start of Section 2.3.1, that any two events (q1, t1), (q2, t2) 2 G are
connected by a unique extremal, breaks down;
(iii) the relation of classical and quantum mechanics, since a Lagrangian submani-
fold is in eect the classical analogue of a pure quantum state (taken as an assignment
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of values to a complete set of observables).14
For us, the main point is, as before, about the structure of the modal involvement.
Namely: the graph of St gives us a preferred set of worlds, i.e. alternative states in
phase space. Besides, we can analyse the structure of the set of possible preferred
sets by studying the set of all Lagrangian manifolds; (or instead, its quotient by the
time-evolution under the Hamiltonian H).
So much by way of surveying the structure of Hamilton-Jacobi theory’s set of
ensembles|surveying the riches of (Modality;1st). I close this Section with a philo-
sophical remark, which looks ahead to Section 5. There I will deny that possible states
of aairs (or facts or other \truthmakers") could be what make true an actually true
proposition; (for, I will claim, only actual states of aairs could do that.) But for
all I have so far said about Hamilton-Jacobi theory, one might think that it involves
precisely this idea. After all, what else might the use of an S-function i.e. an ensemble
of possible systems (for example, to solve a problem) come to? But in fact, there is no
conflict. Agreed, Hamilton and Jacobi teach us to use an S-function to solve problems,
and for a single problem there are many S-functions we can consider (which do not all
dier just by the time-parameter). But there is no strange influence (whether causal or
constitutive) of the S-function, or the ensemble it represents, on the actual system (or
propositions about it). In particular, the evolution of a system (its trajectory in con-
guration space or phase space) is xed by, for example, the initial conditions|q, _q, t
in Lagrangian mechanics and q, p, t in Hamiltonian mechanics|irrespective of which if
any S-function we care to use.15
5 “Actualism” refuted?
As I said at the end of Section 3, it seems odd, even mysterious, to state an actual
dynamical law by a comparison of the actual history with possible histories that do
not obey it|yet variational principles do just this. I shall argue that in fact there is
no problem here. But the topic repays scrutiny: it yields insights, both philosophical
(Section 5.1) and technical (Section 5.2), and raises some open questions.16
14For more details about Lagrangian submanifolds, cf. e.g. Arnold (1989, Chap.s 7,8), Littlejohn
(1992, Sections 1-3).
15Incidentally, the situation is dierent in quantum theory. There, S has a close mathematical
cousin (also written S) whose values do influence the motion of the system. But again, this does
not represent any weird \possibilia power" (Lewis 1986a, p. 158). For this influence is regarded as
a strong, indeed the strongest, reason to take the quantum S-function as part of the actual physical
state of the individual system; i.e. not as in classical mechanics, as \just" a description of an ensemble.
16The topic seems wholly ignored in the philosophical literature about variational principles. But
thanks to the rise of modal metaphysics in analytical philosophy|over which Lewis presided so
magnicently|the topic is nowadays plainly visible. Incidentally: the literature has instead focussed
almost entirely on the way (i) specifying nal conditions and (ii) referring to least action, suggests tele-
ology. Indeed, this focus has been dominant ever since Maupertuis (cf. e.g. Yourgrau and Mandelstam
(1979, Chap. 14), Dugas (1988)). But I set it aside entirely.
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I shall concentrate on Lagrangian mechanics, and specically on Hamilton’s Prin-
ciple. Recall that for the simple systems we are concerned with, this states that the
motion between prescribed congurations at time t1 and time t2 makes stationary the




L(q1, . . . , qn, _q1, . . . , _qn) dt = 0 . (5.1)
This involves (Modality;3rd): not because it formulates non-actual laws, but because
of the kind of variation it uses to state the actual law.
I say ‘shall concentrate’ for two reasons, the rst \positive" and the second \neg-
ative". (1): I shall also mention the modied Hamilton’s Principle of Hamiltonian
mechanics. Of course, for our simple systems with non-vanishing Hessian, eq. 2.6,
these are equivalent; and so the discussion applies equally to Lagrangian and Hamil-
tonian mechanics. But there will also be a distinction between the Lagrangian and
Hamiltonian approaches which is worth noting.
(2): There are, even within Lagrangian mechanics, several other variational princi-
ples (e.g. principles of least action, least constraint and least curvature) which I will
not discuss. My reason for ignoring them is not just lack of space. Also, (i): Broadly
speaking, Hamilton’s Principle is more important than them, since in almost all devel-
opments of Lagrangian mechanics it acts as the main postulate, the other variational
principles being deduced from it under various conditions. (ii): Broadly speaking, the
philosophical discussion in Section 5.1 carries over to these other principles. Or so I
contend, without having the space to prove it!17
5.1 The threat and the answer
I shall rst emphasise the threat that a variational principle like Hamilton’s Principle
poses; and then argue that fortunately, the threat can be answered.
5.1.1 The threat
The threat is simply stated. Formulating an actual law, say the law of motion of a
classical mechanical system18, as mentioning other possible evolutions of the system
apparently violates a very plausible philosophical principle: that any actually true
proposition (not only: any law of nature) should be made true by actual facts, i.e.
17I admit that there are many philosophically important dierences between the various principles,
including about their modal involvements. Consider for example the dierent denitions of variation
used in Hamilton’s Principle, Gauss’ principle of least constraint and Euler-Lagrange-Jacobi’s principle
of least action (cf. e.g. Lanczos 1986, Chap.s IV.8 and V.4-8). But these dierences do not aect the
philosophical discussion of (Modality;3rd) that follows.
18Recall from footnote 10 that my saying ‘actual’ here and elsewhere is not meant to deny the
quantum!
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goings-on in the actual world. This principle is plausible. My informal surveys suggest
it is accepted by all philosophers concerned with modality|though they may oer
rival precise versions of it! That is, philosophers disagree about such topics as laws
of nature, the nature of modality (in particular, the status of possible worlds), and
the nature of the truthmakers (objects, events, states of aairs or whatever) that make
true the actually true propositions. But so far as I can tell, they agree to this principle:
actually true propositions are made true by \something or other" in the actual world.
It will be convenient to have a word for this (logically weak) principle. I will call it
‘actualism’.19
This consensus in favour of actualism, in my sense, is not special to philosophy. I
nd that actualism wins the assent of physicists and other outsiders to philosophy. In
particular, actualism surely underlies the point often stressed in physics that a system’s
history, for given initial conditions, cannot depend on what ensemble it is considered
to be a member of: cf. the discussion at the end of Section 4.2 of the quantum-classical
contrast concerning whether S is physically real, as shown by its influence on the
system’s trajectory. To sum up: the threat is that variational principles apparently
violate actualism.20
Of course, Lewis himself advocated a logically stronger doctrine, Humean superve-
nience: which adds to actualism’s demand that actual truths require actual \facts",
the requirement that the actual facts must be \at bottom local". As Lewis writes:
. . . all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular
fact, just one little thing and then another ... We have ... relations of
spatio-temporal distance between points ... And at those points we have
local qualities ... For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that
is all. There is no dierence without a dierence in the arrangement of
qualities. All else supervenes on that. (1986b, p. ix-x)
Since the doctrine is stronger, the threat of course carries over: Humean supervenience
is apparently violated by an actual law mentioning goings-on in other possible worlds.
‘First say it; then qualify it’; as Lewis goes on to remark in his discussion of Humean
supervenience (ibid.). I also should qualify the claim that variational principles violate
actualism. (Hence I wrote ‘apparently violate’ above.) I admit that a philosopher
could dismiss the threat in two ways. (1): She could be strongly instrumentalist about
variational principles, saying that they do not purport to be true|even contingently,
and irrespective of whether they are laws. I reply that I have no truck with this kind of
instrumentalism. Besides, I cannot imagine a motivation for it, except as an instance of
a general instrumentalism about all theoretical claims: a general instrumentalism that
19With apologies to Lewis and other aficionados of modal metaphysics, who have come to use this
word for the denial of Lewis’ own modal realism.
20So as regards this threat, it does not matter whether the possible evolutions mentioned by the
law are contralegal, as they are in the case of Hamilton’s Principle.
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is anyway nowadays unpopular, displaced in large part by van Fraassen’s constructive
empiricism.21
(2): She could say that the variations mentioned in variational principles have noth-
ing to do with possibilities of the sort discussed by actualism (or in modal metaphysics
generally). Again, I have no truck with this. As I said in Section 3, mechanics is up
to its ears in modality, of some kind or kinds. And no sign is ever given that modal
locutions like ‘could’, with which the notions and mathematics of virtual displace-
ments, variations etc. are introduced, are to be understood dierently from elsewhere
in science or everyday life; so why should they be?
5.1.2 The answer
I turn to answering the threat. I shall adapt a two-stage strategy which is straightfor-
ward (and traditional in philosophy). According to this strategy, when one is confronted
with problematic entities, one must rst show how to do without them; and also, if
possible, show how it is useful or convenient to speak as if they exist (so as to explain,
perhaps even justify, \how the vulgar speak"). In our case, the entities at issue|the
possible histories of the system|are not themselves problematic; (I of course set aside
the debate about the nature of possibilities, i.e. Lewis’ modal realism vs. various
ersatzisms and ctionalisms). Rather, what is problematic is the way these entities
are mentioned (viz. as truthmakers of actual truths). But clearly, we can adapt the
two-stage strategy to \problematic mentions". So I propose to argue that:
(A): The mention of possible (indeed, contralegal) histories can be eliminated|the
laws can be formulated without it; and
(B): Though eliminable, it nevertheless has some features that make it useful (or
even: advantageous compared with formulations of the laws that do not mention con-
tralegal histories).
The argument for (A) will be straightforward for simple mechanical systems, but
will also prompt some non-obvious points. But (B) involves various features of the
calculus of variations, and I will address it in Section 5.2.
It is interesting|and appropriate, in memory of Lewis|to compare the discussion
of (A) and (B) to follow, with what Lewis says about counterfactuals. For he of
course recognizes that his proposed truth-conditions for counterfactuals in terms of
similarity between possible worlds seem to violate actualism, in my sense. After all,
Lewis proposes for an actually true counterfactual, truth-conditions in terms of other
worlds! Roughly speaking, A ! C is actually true if some (A&C)-world is closer (i.e.
more similar) to the actual world than any (A&:C)-world is. So Lewis poses the threat
to actualism, as follows:
Here is our world, which has a certain qualitative character. (In as broad
a sense of ‘qualitative’ as may be required|include irreducible causal rela-
21But there is a rich subject here. Stoeltzner (2003) is a fascinating study of the logical empiricists’
treatment|and mistreatment!|of variational principles in mechanics.
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tions, laws, chances, and whatnot if you believe in them.) There are all the
various A-worlds, with their various characters. Some of them are closer to
our world than others. If some (A&C)-world is closer to our world than any
(A&:C)-world is, that’s what makes the counterfactual true at our world.
Now ... it’s the character of our world that makes some A-worlds be closer
to it than others. So, after all, it’s the character of our world that makes
the counterfactual true|in which case why bring the other worlds into the
story at all? (1986, p. 22)
He replies immediately, saying
It is indeed the character of our world that makes the counterfactual true.
But it is only by bringing the other worlds into the story that we can say in
any concise way what character it takes to make what counterfactuals true.
The other worlds provide a frame of reference whereby we can characterize
our world ... (ibid.)
I think that, given the importance in Lewis’ metaphysical system of both the threat-
ened doctrine (actualism, or more strongly: Humean supervenience) and the threaten-
ing counterfactuals (assumed to have possible-world truth-conditions), one would like
Lewis to say more by way of reply to this threat. In particular, can more be said about
‘the character of our world’, i.e. about the this-worldly truthmakers of true counter-
factuals? (Cf. our (A).) And why is mention of other worlds the only concise way to
describe these this-worldly truthmakers? (Cf. our (B).) But so far as I can tell, this
passage is all Lewis says on the topic.22
In any case, there will be a contrast here between Lewis’ metaphysical system and
our concern: mechanics and the calculus of variations. That is to say, in our simpler
and more technically precise framework, we will be able to say more by way of reply to
the threat: both about our (A), i.e. how to eliminate mention of the possible histories,
and have only this-worldly truthmakers for the actual laws of motion; and about our
(B), i.e. why mentioning possible histories is useful.
So I turn to arguing for (A): that it is possible to eliminate the mention of pos-
sible histories. Focussing on Hamilton’s Principle, I need there to be a statement or
statements equivalent to Hamilton’s Principle that are safely actualist. Here ‘equiv-
alence’ means logical equivalence; (or perhaps mathematical equivalence, understood
in the usual way as logical equivalence, once given the assumption of appropriate pure
mathematical propositions). And for the simple mechanical systems we have focussed
22Here is an analogy that I often use in explaining Lewis’ reply. To describe Buenos Aires concisely
to a friend who is unfamiliar with it, you might forego listing its intrinsic properties, and instead use
a comparison with something familiar to your friend; thinking of the harbour and summer in January,
you might say, for example, ‘It’s like a Spanish-speaking Sydney’. I confess I believed Lewis invented
this (Australophile!) analogy; but now I cannot nd it in his published work. Maybe he just told me
it|as so often, smiling whimsically.
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on since Section 2.1, there are such statements. For as noted in Section 2.1, the Euler-
Lagrange equations eq. 2.2 are for simple systems not only necessary but also sucient
for Hamilton’s Principle eq. 2.4. And these equations are safely actualist in our sense:
they do not mention possible histories.23 In short: Hamilton’s Principle can be re-
garded for simple systems as a corollary of the \kosher" actualist laws, Lagrange’s
equations eq. 2.2.
The same point applies to Hamiltonian mechanics for simple systems with non-zero
Hessian, eq. 2.6. In this context, Hamilton’s equations eq. 2.8 are equivalent, by the
Legendre transformation eq. 2.7, to Lagrange’s equations eq. 2.2. So again, taking
Hamilton’s equations as laws of analytical mechanics|as we no doubt should!|they
illustrate (Modality;1st) and (Modality;2nd) but not (Modality;3rd).
But this argument for (A) is not \the whole story"; (whether it uses Lagrange’s
equations or Hamilton’s). There is plenty more to explore here, even apart from (B)|
which I postpone to Section 5.2. I shall just make two technical, and two philosophical,
points.
The technical points concern aspects of modality that are not caught by this ar-
gument’s equivalence. The most obvious one concerns the free variation of the ps in
the modied Hamilton’s Principle eq. 2.9. This gives another illustration of (Modal-
ity;3rd). Indeed, it is a more \extreme" illustration than that given by the original
Hamilton’s Principle eq. 2.1. For the latter, we contralegally vary q and so _q. But for
the modied Hamilton’s Principle, once we are given such a variation of q (and so _q),
we independently vary the ps (violating p = ∂L/∂ _q). So our variations are \doubly
contralegal".
Second, nothing said here justies (A) for mechanical systems that are not simple.
As mentioned at the end of Section 2.1, this is a subtle matter: both technically
(cf. Papastavridis 2002, pp. 960-973), and philosophically. I postpone it to another
occasion.
The two philosophical points bring us back to Lewis. The rst arises from the
temptation to say that a mystery remains, even after the argument for (A) for simple
systems. Thus it is tempting to ask: how can one of two equivalent formulations of a
law (or theory)|Hamilton’s Principle, on the one hand, and Lagrange’s equations or
Hamilton’s equations, on the other|have a modal involvement that the other lacks?
Indeed, it is tempting to ask more generally: How can there be a logical equivalence
between a proposition with actualistically acceptable truth-conditions and one making
\transworld comparisons"?24
23Agreed, they are modally involved; at least if we take them as putative laws of analytical
mechanics|as we no doubt should! For then we will take them as applying to possible as well
as actual initial conditions (given by the qs and _qs), and to possible as well as actual problems.
That is, they will illustrate (Modality;1st) and (Modality;2nd), in Section 3’s classication; but not
(Modality;3rd).
24Most philosophers agree that there may well be a notion of theoretical, not merely empirical,
equivalence such that laws or even whole theories that are theoretically equivalent could yet have
heuristic, and even ontological, dierences. Still, there can seem to be a mystery about our argument
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The reply to this is that there is no paradox in the idea that a proposition making
a transworld comparison can be true at a single world. After all, this is exactly what
is proposed by analyses of counterfactuals, like those of Lewis, Stalnaker et al., that
appeal to similarity of worlds. Note that this reply is independent of actualism. That
is: actualists will of course nd it natural to assign a proposition a truth-value relative
to the world at which it is evaluated, i.e. at which there is or is not the truthmaker it
claims. But even a non-actualist (if there are any!) could accept as a matter of logic
or semantics, that a proposition that makes a transworld comparison, in their strong
sense that its truthmaker is \scattered among the worlds" is assigned a truth-value
relative to a single world.25
My second philosophical point is more positive. There is a striking analogy between
what a variational principle says and Lewis’ proposed truth-conditions for counterfac-
tuals A ! C. The analogy concerns how they compare the actual with the possible.
Recall that, to avoid the assumption that there is a set of A-worlds all tied for rst
equal as regards similarity to the actual world @ (i.e. the limit assumption), Lewis
proposes that a counterfactual A ! C, is true at @ i: for any A&:C-world, there is
a A&C-world that is more similar to @.
Turning to variational principles, I shall take Hamilton’s Principle; though the same
analogy could be drawn with any number of principles. The principle says, roughly
speaking, that:
Any kinematically possible history of the system that deviates from the
actual history between t0 and t1, but matches the actual history as regards





More precisely, the principle says that the actual history is a stationary point of the
action. So we need to rephrase to express the principle’s allowance that:
(i): the actual history could be a maximum of action, not a minimum;
(ii): the minimum or maximum need only be local;
(iii): the actual history could be a point of inflexion (associated with higher
derivatives also vanishing).
In fact, we get a strong and simple analogy with Lewis if we rephrase to accommodate
(i) and (ii), but ignore (iii). In particular, (ii) corresponds to Lewis’ rejecting the limit
assumption, and so adopting the \negative" phrasing ‘for any A&:C-world, there is a
A&C-world ...’. I will adopt this tactic. So we get:
For any kinematically possible history of the system that (a) deviates from
for (A); since both the equivalence of the formulations, and their having dierent modal involvements,
seem matters of logic.
25Incidentally, the use of truth-assignments relative to two or more worlds in many-dimensional
modal logic (and similarly: relative to two or more times in temporal logic) is, so far as I can tell, no
evidence for non-actualism. For these logics invoke multiple worlds or times to keep track of rigidied
uses of ‘actually’ or temporal indexicals, not to keep track of truthmakers scattered among the worlds.
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the actual history between t0 and t1, but matches the actual history as
regards the congurations q0, q1 at times t0, t1, and (b) has the same value
of the action I =
∫ t1
t0
L dt as the actual history:
there is another kinematically possible history of the system satisfying (a),
that also deviates less from the actual history (in its values of q and _q) and
that has a value for the action I larger or smaller than the actual history.
The analogy is evident. A history of the system corresponds to a Lewisian possible
world; similarity of histories is a matter of rst xing the congurations at the end-
points, and then closeness of the values of q and _q; and so on. In particular, we can
portray Hamilton’s Principle as itself a battery of counterfactuals, by taking for the
proposition A a specication of some non-actual value of q (or _q) at some intermediate
time or times t, t0 < t < t1, and for C the proposition that the value for the action I
is larger or is smaller than its actual value.
To sum up this discussion of (A): I have argued that at least for simple systems we
can identify the this-worldly truthmakers of Hamilton’s Principle, namely in Lagrange’s
(or equivalently: Hamilton’s) equations. And variational principles thereby provide a
neat analogy or \toy-model" for Lewis’ analysis of counterfactuals: I like to think he
would have been amused by it.
5.2 The calculus of variations revisited
I turn to the claim that in the last Subsection I dubbed (B): that though mention by
classical dynamical laws of possible (indeed contralegal) histories is eliminable, it is
also advantageous; in other words, that it is advantageous to formulate these laws as
variational principles.
I admit that I shall duck out of giving a general argument for (B). Like Lewis on
counterfactuals (1986, p. 22; cf. my Section 5.1), I will oer no single general advantage
of variational formulations. My reason is the advantages are many, diverse and some-
times very technical. The calculus of variations remains an active research area, with
deep connections to various branches of mathematics in addition to mechanics. (For
a taster, cf. e.g. Courant and Hilbert (1953, Chap IV); for a banquet, cf. Giaquinta
and Hildebrandt (1996).) So it would be well-nigh impossible to list the advantages
gained by adopting the notions, and general perspective, of the calculus of variations;
not just for mechanics, but for any eld that uses variational principles. So I shall just
mention two examples of advantages of variational principles in analytical mechanics
that would appear on any such list.
(i): The role of variational principles in understanding symmetry, especially sym-
metries of the Lagrangian giving Noether’s theorems.
(ii): I choose my second example to illustrate how a piece of formalism within a
theory can be advantageous, not only as regards that same theory, but also in illu-
minating another theory; (and maybe heuristically useful in constructing that other
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theory). I have in mind how Hamilton’s Principle illuminates the path integral formu-
lation of quantum theory; both by providing a classical limit of it, and by heuristically
suggesting it.
Finally, I should note an important topic related to (B): the topic, not of the
advantages of a variational formulation of laws, but of the conditions under which such
a formulation can be given. A bit more precisely, the topic is: ‘under what conditions
can we infer from a set of dynamical (dierential) equations, a variational principle?’
This is itself a big subject, with subtle philosophical aspects|not least the question
I raised in Section 5.1, about how to argue for (A) for non-simple systems. (For details
of this subject, cf. e.g. Santilli (1979).) Here I shall just consider a small aspect: what
follows expands on Lanczos (1986, pp. 170-72)|who credits Ostrogradsky writing in
1850!
The key idea is that the modied Hamilton’s Principle provides a correspondence
between a general class of variational problems and systems of ordinary dierential
equations arranged in conjugate pairs. The class of variational problems is given by
the extremization of an integral∫
L(qi, _qi, q¨i, . . . , q
(m)
i , t) dt ; (5.2)
where (m) indicates the mth derivative with respect to t; and where L is of course an
arbitrary function (it need not have mechanical signicance); with the extremization
subject to not only the qi, but also their derivatives upto the (m−1)th, being prescribed
at the end-points.
I shall describe the correspondence for the simplest case beyond the already familiar
one, i.e. m = 1, δ
∫
L(qi, _qi, t) dt = 0. That is, I shall allow at most a second time
derivative as an argument of L. I shall also assume just one degree of freedom. It will
be clear enough how the correspondence generalizes to more than one q, and to yet
higher derivatives.
Consider then the extremization of∫
L(q, _q, q¨, t) dt (5.3)
subject to q and _q being prescribed at the initial and nal times. One easily adapts
the usual calculus of variations argument to this case. The boundary conditions now
require the arbitrary function representing the variation of q, say η, not only to vanish
at the end-points, but also to have vanishing rst derivative there. The deduction
proceeds much as usual, but now includes an integration by parts of ∂L
∂q¨
η¨, as well as






















We proceed to nd corresponding canonical equations. First we dene a \momen-
tum" u := ∂L
∂q¨
, and then perform a Legendre transformation, dening H  H(q, _q, u, t) :=
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uq¨ − L; so that L = uq¨ −H(q, _q, u, t). So our variational problem δ ∫ L dt = 0 is mod-
ied to δ
∫
[uq¨ −H(q, _q, u, t)] dt = 0. An integration by parts of the rst term reduces
this to a variational problem of the familiar kind, in q, u and their rst derivatives: i.e.
δ
∫
[−H(q, _q, u, t) − _u _q] dt = 0. Now given this problem, we can in the familiar way
dene conjugate momenta, p1, p2 say, of q, u, and get two pairs of canonical equations.
These are equivalent to the dierential equation eq. 5.4.
This method easily generalizes to any number of degrees of freedom, qi; and it
generalizes to higher derivatives than the second. In the general case of mth derivatives,
we rst reduce them to (m−1)th derivatives by an integration by parts, and then repeat
the process until eventually only rst derivatives appear in the integrand, and we can
pass to the corresponding canonical equations.
This result also gives a characterization of the dierential equations corresponding
to a variational principle (of the above class). Though an arbitrary system of dierential
equations can be given the form
_qi = fi(q1, . . . , qn, t) (5.5)
by introducing suitable independent variables q1, . . . , qn, in general the functions fi will
of course be dierent for dierent i. On the other hand: dierential equations obtained
from a variational principle are derivable from a single function H by dierentiation. In
short: Hamilton’s canonical equations are a normal form for the dierential equations
arising from a variational principle.
To sum up: we have shown how to pass from an arbitrary variational principle
(of our class) to a system of canonical equations, all rst-order in time and with all
variables’ time-derivatives given by dierentiating a single function H . In eect, this
result takes the question that has been the focus of this Section|‘how can it be that
the actual laws of motion admit a variational formulation?’|as a technical question;
instead of as a philosophical question, as in Section 5.1. And the result, i.e. the corre-
spondence between a large class of variational problems and sets of canonical equations,
answers as follows:|
‘This is possible because the actual laws of motion, i.e. Hamilton’s equations, have
the very special feature that their right-hand sides, that specify the time derivatives
of all the variables, are all derivatives of one and the same function H . If that were
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